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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the psychological concept of anxiety into agency theory.
An important benchmark in the anxiety literature is the inverted-U hypothesis which
states that an increase in anxiety improves performance when anxiety is low but
reduces it when anxiety is high. We consider a version of the Holmstr¨ om-Milgrom
linear principal-agent model where the agent conforms to the inverted-U hypothesis
and investigate the nature of the optimal linear contract. We ﬁnd that although
high-powered incentives can be demotivational, a proﬁt-maximizing principal never
oﬀers them. In contrast, the principal may optimally engage in a demotivational
level of monitoring. Moreover, since risk can be motivational, the principal may
refrain from eliminating it even when monitoring is costless. Indeed, the principal
may even add pure noise to the contract in order to motivate the agent, contradicting
the informativeness principle. Finally, incentives and monitoring can be strategic
substitutes or complements in our model.Ultimately, it may be that psychologists, behaviorists, human resource
consultants, and personnel executives understand something about human
behavior and motivation that is not yet captured in our economic models.
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988, p. 615)
1. Introduction
Some fundamental assumptions and predictions of standard principal-agent theory
seem to be at odds with a signiﬁcant and growing body of empirical and experi-
mental evidence.
Incentives
There is little doubt that monetary incentives can be a powerful motivational force.
For example, Lazear (2000) reports that productivity increased by about 44% when
the Safelite Glass Corporation switched from hourly wages to piece rates:
Some conclusions are unambiguous. Workers respond to prices just as
economic theory predicts. Claims by sociologists and others that monetizing
incentives may actually reduce output are unambiguously refuted by the
data.
Lazear (2000, p. 1347).
In contrast, the claim that incentives are always motivational, in all contexts and
circumstances, is highly controversial in management, psychology, sociology, and
the broader social sciences, and the non-economic literature is replete with evidence
that incentives can undermine intrinsic motivation and even reduce performance.
Furthermore, recent experimental work by economists support these ﬁndings; see
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Gneezy (2003), Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and
Mazar (2005), and the survey by Frey and Jegen (2001). If incentives can have
“hidden costs” or even be counterproductive, this may help to explain why extensive
piece rate systems like the well-known case of Lincoln Electric1 seem to be the
1 “The Lincoln Electric Company,” Case 376-028, Harvard Business School.
1exception rather than the norm, as well as the widespread view, articulated in
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and Jensen and Murphy (1990), that incentives
often appear weak in real-world organizations.
A nascent but growing theoretical literature attempts to explain how and un-
der what circumstances incentives can be demotivational. Gibbs (1991) informally
argues that a contingent reward can signal that the probability of promotion is
high, dulling promotion incentives. B´ enabou and Tirole (2003) show that incen-
tives can have hidden costs when they signal that a task is diﬃcult or distasteful
or the agent’s skill is low. In B´ enabou and Tirole (2006), extrinsic incentives can
“crowd out” intrinsic motivation and reputational concerns when the agent initially
engages in prosocial behavior (e.g., giving blood or volunteering) to signal proso-
cial preferences to herself or others. The previous two papers formalize and extend
certain aspects of motivation crowding theory surveyed in Frey and Jegen (2001).
Casadesus-Masanell (2004) shows that it may be in the agent’s best interest to de-
velop intrinsic motivation in the form of norms, ethical standards, or altruism. In
that context, extrinsic incentives can reduce eﬀort, performance, and total surplus.
Risk-Reward Tradeoﬀ and Monitoring
A central feature of principal-agent theory is the familiar risk-reward tradeoﬀ. In
the standard linear model (SLM) of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987, 1991) and the
textbook version in Milgrom and Roberts (1992), optimal incentives are decreasing
in the variance of the performance measure (risk) when the latter is exogenous. If
the principal has access to a monitoring technology which can reduce the variance
at some cost, then risk is endogenous and incentives and monitoring are strategic
complements. Although the agent’s optimal eﬀort is independent of monitoring and
risk, an increase in monitoring allows for greater incentives, which in turn induce
higher eﬀort, so all three should be positively related.
In his inﬂuential survey, however, Prendergast (1999, p. 19) characterizes
the evidence for the existence of a risk-reward tradeoﬀ as being “rather mixed.”
2Furthermore, Barkema’s (1995) empirical results using data on top managers at
medium-sized Dutch ﬁrms suggests that monitoring can be demotivational when
the principal-agent relationship is close. In accordance with motivation crowding
theory, his explanation is that monitoring can signal distrust and thereby reduce
intrinsic motivation.
The Psychology of Uncertainty and Inverted-U Hypothesis
In economics, the concept of risk aversion captures a basic attitude towards risk,
while the concept of risk premium measures the cost of risk, both of which are
reﬂected in the curvature of the utility function. Likewise, uncertainty and human
reactions to it are also important in psychology, where the corresponding concept
is that of anxiety. Given their common focus, it is not surprising that there is some
overlap between these two concepts. For example, anxiety is a “negative emotion”
connected with uncertainty and, similarly, the risk premium measures the cost of
risk and enters negatively in the agent’s expected utility [see equation (5) below].
There are some diﬀerences, however, between these concepts. In particular, anxiety
explicitly incorporates a variety of cognitive processes such as worry which are at
most implicit in its economic counterparts. In the next section, we provide a brief
introduction to the anxiety literature in psychology.
An important benchmark in the anxiety literature is the inverted-U hypothesis
or Yerkes-Dodson Law, which simply states that the relationship between anxiety
and performance (e.g., athletic performance, information processing, reaction times,
test scores, etc.) takes the form of an inverted-U: an increase in anxiety improves
performance when anxiety is low, but decreases it when anxiety is high. Although
the empirical psychology literature is mixed, numerous studies support the inverted-
U hypothesis [for a survey of the evidence, see Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001)].
Following seminal contributions by Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and Leahy
(2001), there now exists a small but growing anxiety literature in economics. The
former paper uses a reduced form representation to investigate some implications of
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paper and a related contribution by Rauh and Seccia (2006) attempt to provide
decision-theoretic foundations for the anxiety concept. Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein,
and Mazar (2005) speciﬁcally invoke the inverted-U hypothesis to explain their
experimental results.
Given the relative importance of the inverted-U hypothesis, the central question
of the present paper is: what are the implications for the principal’s optimal choice of
incentives and monitoring when the agent’s behavior conforms to it? To investigate
these issues, we consider a reduced-form representation where the agent’s disutility
of eﬀort depends on the variance of income, so that an increase in income risk is
motivational (i.e., reduces the marginal cost of eﬀort) when income risk is low, and is
demotivational when income risk is high. Although we do not model the underlying
psychological processes, this formalization is broadly consistent with the processing
eﬃciency theory from cognitive psychology and the endogenous learning-by-doing
model in Rauh and Seccia (2006), which focus on the implications of anxiety for
the agent’s optimal choice of eﬀort (we brieﬂy discuss these theories in the next
section). Moreover, the agent’s maximization problem is a special case of the Caplin
and Leahy (2001) psychological expected utility framework.
After incorporating the eﬀects of anxiety in this way, the agent’s behavior
conforms to the inverted-U hypothesis. In particular, high-powered incentives and
intense monitoring can be demotivational as found by Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein,
and Mazar (2005) and Barkema (1995). As Prendergast (1999, p. 18) points out,
however, there is little conclusive evidence for the existence of counterproductive
incentives in actual workplace settings. In this paper, we reconcile these two strands
of the literature by showing that although exogenously determined high-powered
incentives can be demotivational, a proﬁt-maximizing principal never endogenously
oﬀers them.
In contrast, we show that the principal optimally engages in a demotivational
4level of monitoring when the agent is suﬃciently risk averse, in line with Barkema’s
(1995) empirical ﬁndings. Furthermore, the traditional risk-reward relationship
breaks down in our model in the sense that optimal incentives can be non-monotonic
in risk when the latter is exogenous. If the principal has access to a costly monitoring
technology, so that both incentives and risk are endogenous, then incentives and
monitoring can be strategic substitutes as well as complements in our model. These
results may help explain the aforementioned mixed evidence for the existence of a
risk-reward tradeoﬀ. Finally, since risk can be motivational, the principal may want
to manipulate it in ways that are at odds with the SLM. In particular, the principal
may refrain from eliminating it even when monitoring is costless and may even
want to add extraneous noise to motivate the agent, which violates the well-known
informativeness principle.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy survey
the anxiety literature in both economics and psychology. In section 3, we present
the model and results. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Anxiety Literature in Economics and Psychology
The main purpose of this section is to orient the reader to what is perhaps an
unfamiliar subject and to provide a basis for assessing to what extent our reduced-
form representation of anxiety is consistent with the anxiety literatures in economics
and psychology. For further information, see Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Rauh and
Seccia (2006) in the economics literature and the surveys by Woodman and Hardy
(2001) and Zaichkowsky and Baltzell (2001) in the sports psychology literature.
5Deﬁnition of Anxiety
According to Woodman and Hardy (2001, p. 290-291),
Anxiety is generally accepted as being an unpleasant emotion... Re-
searchers in mainstream psychology have suggested that anxiety might have
at least two distinguishable components: a mental component normally
termed cognitive anxiety or worry, and a physiological component normally
termed somatic anxiety or physiological arousal.
(italics in the original).
Anxiety is therefore a multi-dimensional construct. The ﬁrst component, cognitive
anxiety, is further described as follows:
Worry is a cognitive phenomenon, it is concerned with future events
where there is uncertainty about the outcome, the future being thought
about is a negative one, and this is accompanied by feelings of anxiety.
MacLeod, Williams, and Bekerian (1991, p. 478)
[as quoted in Caplin and Leahy (2001)].
Like the economic concepts of risk aversion and risk premium, cognitive anxiety is
associated with uncertainty, but unlike them it has an explicitly cognitive character.
The second component, somatic anxiety or physiological arousal, is connected with
physical symptoms such as an elevated heart rate and shaky hands: “indications of
autonomic arousal and unpleasant feeling states such as nervousness and tension”
[Morris, Davis, and Hutchings (1981, p. 541)]. Although physiological arousal can
be a major factor in the heat of the moment and for tasks with a signiﬁcant motor
component, it seems less important for the study of incentive mechanisms, where
the time horizon is longer and the physical aspects of most tasks are relatively
minor. We therefore focus exclusively on cognitive anxiety from now on.
The benchmark inverted-U hypothesis (discussed in the introduction) is an
empirical generalization, like the Phillips curve in macroeconomics. We now turn
to psychological theories which have the potential to explain and justify it.
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The starting point for most anxiety theories in psychology is that the agent’s initial
reaction to uncertainty is negative, since it induces worry:
Worrisome thoughts interfere with attention to task-relevant informa-
tion, thus reducing the cognitive resources available for task-processing ac-
tivities. As a consequence, performance is impaired.
Eysenck and Calvo (1992, p. 410).
It is therefore clear how anxiety could reduce performance. What is not clear, how-
ever, is how it could improve it, which was the initial motivation for the development
of the processing eﬃciency theory by Eysenck and Calvo (1992).
One is concerned with the explanation of the relationship between anx-
iety and performance, taking into account not only the data regarding the
negative eﬀects of anxiety, but also trying to reconcile them with those ﬁnd-
ings indicating a lack of eﬀect (or even a positive one).
(ibid, p. 410).
The main contribution of the processing eﬃciency theory is the hypothesis that
anxiety can serve a motivational function, inducing the agent to increase eﬀort:
Worry about task performance has a second eﬀect within the [processing
eﬃciency] theory. It serves a motivational function... In order to escape from
the state of apprehension associated with worrisome thoughts and to avoid
the likely aversive consequences of poor performance, anxious subjects try
to cope with threat and worry allocating additional resources (i.e. eﬀort)
and/or initiating processing activities (i.e. strategies).
(ibid, p. 415).
Whether or not the agent responds with increased eﬀort depends on the probability
of success:
Thus, unless the likelihood or the estimated intensity of aversive conse-
quences is higher if one continues on the task than if one avoids the task,
subjects will generally proceed with the task with increased eﬀort.
ibid, p. 413.
An increase in anxiety can therefore improve performance if the agent is motivated
to increase eﬀort to such an extent that it outweighs the initial negative impact of
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suﬃciently high and may even “give up” altogether (reduce eﬀort to zero). In that
case, the overall impact of anxiety is unambiguously negative.
Reversal Theory
Another theory that has the potential to explain the inverted-U hypothesis is rever-
sal theory due to Apter (1982). In this theory, an agent can pass through distinct
“meta-motivational” states characterized by diﬀerent reactions to uncertainty. For
example, in a paratelic state the agent is risk-loving (to use economic terminology)
and interprets uncertainty as excitement or exhilaration, whereas in a telic state the
agent is risk averse and perceives uncertainty as anxiety. Presumably, an increase
in uncertainty would improve performance in the former state and reduce it in the
latter. Although much broader in scope, these aspects of reversal theory are similar
to the familiar economic context of an agent whose cubic utility function is initially
convex and then concave.
To our knowledge, the only formal theories of anxiety are in economics. Among
economists, anxiety research was pioneered by Loewenstein (1987) and Caplin and
Leahy (2001). We now sketch the latter, since the agent’s decision problem in our
model can be viewed as a special case.
Psychological Expected Utility Theory
Caplin and Leahy (2001) consider a two-period decision problem under uncertainty.
The novel element in their psychological expected utility theory is an exogenous map
φ(z1,l2) which assigns a ﬁrst period psychological state (e.g., anxiety, fear, longing,
etc.) to the ﬁrst period outcome z1 and induced lottery l2 over second period
outcomes z2. The agent’s utility function is
u1[φ(z1,l2)] + El2[u2(z2)], (1)
8where u1 and u2 are the period utility functions and El2 denotes the expectation
with respect to the lottery l2. Note that u1 is deﬁned over psychological states, as
opposed to the more familiar case of economic outcomes. The ﬁrst period outcome
η(s1,α1) is determined by the ﬁrst period action α1 and ﬁrst period state s1, while
the second period lottery λ(α1,π2|s1) is induced by the latter, as well as the agent’s
second period policy function π2. The agent’s objective function is obtained by
substituting these terms into (1):
u1[φ(η(s1,α1),λ(α1,π2|s1))] + Eλ(α1,π2|s1)[u2(z2)]. (2)
The advantage of this framework is that it can incorporate in a very general
way a wide range of anticipatory emotions, including anxiety. What it possesses
in terms of generality, however, it lacks in terms of detail. In particular, anxiety
remains a “black box” in this theory, since the map φ is exogenous and completely
general, with no structure apart from continuity.
Endogenous Learning-By-Doing Model
In an attempt to provide a more structured anxiety concept, Rauh and Seccia (2006)
consider a two-period decision problem where performance
πt = θet + t (3)
in period t depends on the agent’s skill θ, eﬀort et, and a productivity shock t.
Although the agent is uncertain about the level of θ, at the start of the second
period she can observe her own ﬁrst period performance π1 and Bayesian update.
The agent’s ﬁrst period eﬀort e1 therefore has an important informational role
since the signal is partly endogenous (endogenous learning-by-doing). Anxiety is
then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between expected utility with zero uncertainty and
expected utility evaluated at optimal ﬁrst period eﬀort. As such, it is the opposite
of the usual value of information concept and can be interpreted as the “disutility
of residual uncertainty.”
9An advantage of the endogenous learning-by-doing model is that anxiety is
an endogenous construct consistent with expected utility theory. Moreover, the
agent’s optimal eﬀort and expected performance exhibit aspects of the inverted-
U hypothesis, reversal theory, and the processing eﬃciency theory. In particular,
an increase in the volatility of t garbles the signal π1 and the agent reacts by
increasing e1 to restore some its informativeness when the volatility is low. In
contrast, informativeness is restored by reducing eﬀort when the volatility of t
is suﬃciently high, so the agent’s optimal eﬀort can conform to the inverted-U
hypothesis.
3. Model and Results
We consider a generalization of the SLM in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987, 1991)
and the textbook version in Milgrom and Roberts (1992). Assume output is given by
q = e + , where e is the agent’s eﬀort and  is a normally distributed productivity
shock with mean zero and variance V. We assume the latter is bounded above:
0 ≤ V ≤ V . As usual, we restrict attention to linear compensation rules of the
form I = α + βq, where I is the agent’s income, α is a ﬁxed payment (or receipt),
and β is the incentive parameter or piece rate. We denote the variance of income as
VI = β2V. As is well-known, linear compensation rules are generally suboptimal,
but are assumed for tractability and because they are fairly realistic and relatively
easy to administer. For further discussions of this issue, see Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom
(1987, 1991).
In the SLM, the agent’s utility function is
−exp{−r[I − C(e)]}, (4)
where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and C(e) is the disutility of eﬀort.
As is well-known [see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 137-139)], under these
assumptions the agent’s certainty equivalent is
CEA = α + βe − C(e) − (1/2)rβ2V, (5)
10where the ﬁnal term is the agent’s risk premium.
In this paper, the aim is to derive properties of the optimal linear contract when
the agent’s behavior conforms to the inverted-U hypothesis. To do this, we recall
that most anxiety theories in psychology assume the initial reaction to uncertainty
is worry, which uses up scarce attentional resources and leads to a deterioration in
performance. What happens next, according to the processing eﬃciency, reversal,
and endogenous learning-by-doing theories, depends on how anxiety inﬂuences the
agent’s choice of eﬀort: if uncertainty is perceived as a positive emotion (reversal
theory) and/or acts as a spur, motivating the agent to increase eﬀort (processing
eﬃciency and endogenous learning-by-doing theories), then performance may be
improved, whereas if uncertainty is perceived negatively and/or demoralizes the
agent, performance will decline. What emerges from this literature, therefore, is the
importance of the relationship between anxiety and optimal eﬀort. To incorporate
these eﬀects, we assume a reduced-form expression C(φe) for the agent’s disutility
of eﬀort, under the following assumptions.
Assumptions 1. (i) C and φ(VI) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,∞).
(ii) C0,C00 > 0 on [0,∞). (iii) φ(0) = 1, there exists ˆ VI > 0 such that φ0 < 0 on
[0, ˆ VI) and φ0 > 0 on (ˆ VI,∞), φ(ˆ VI) > 0, and φ00 > 0.
The function φ is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 Goes Here
We ﬁrst note that C(φe) is a standard disutility of eﬀort function when VI = 0,
since φ = 1 in that case. For all VI > 0, the marginal cost of eﬀort φC0 is positive
and increasing in eﬀort as usual. The derivative of the marginal cost of eﬀort with
respect to VI is θφ0, where θ = C0 + φeC00 > 0. It follows that the marginal
cost of eﬀort, an important component of the agent’s motivation, is decreasing in
VI up to VI = ˆ VI and increasing in VI thereafter, which captures the basic idea
11of the inverted-U hypothesis. Moreover, the total cost of eﬀort C(φe) follows the
same pattern, in accordance with reversal theory: the agent interprets uncertainty
positively when it is low and negatively when it is high.
Under these assumptions, the agent’s certainty equivalent is
CEA = α + βe − C(φe) − (1/2)rβ2V, (6)
and the only diﬀerence between (5) and (6) is that φ appears in the latter.
Psychological Expected Utility Theory
In the above interpretation of the model, the agent’s certainty equivalent (6) was
derived assuming exponential utility (4), a normally distributed productivity shock,
and linear compensation rules. Given the reduced form φ, (6) is therefore consistent
with expected utility theory. We now provide a completely diﬀerent interpretation
based on the Caplin-Leahy psychological expected utility theory.
We consider the model as a game with four periods. In the ﬁrst period, the
principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with respect to the contract. In the second,
the agent accepts or rejects. If she rejects, she receives her opportunity cost u. If
she accepts, she chooses eﬀort in period three. In period four, output and the
agent’s income are realized and both parties receive their payoﬀs. In this context,
we assume the agent is risk neutral in the usual sense that u1(x) = u2(x) = x
[cf. equation (1)]. In the third period, there is no state s1 (the productivity shock
occurs in the fourth period) and the agent’s eﬀort e corresponds to α1 in Caplin
and Leahy (as distinguished from the ﬁxed component α of income). The economic
outcome is η(e) ≡ e, so in our model η is simply the identity map. The lottery l2
corresponds to the agent’s stochastic income I,2 so
λ(α1) = λ(e) = α + βq. (7)
2 Formally, l2 equals the probability distribution of I rather than the random variable I itself,
but this distinction is unimportant.
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our φ) that maps the economic outcome and second period lottery to the agent’s
psychological state as follows:
φCL(η(α1),λ(α1)) = φCL(e,I) = −C[φ(VI)e] − (1/2)rVI. (8)
The advantage of the Caplin-Leahy framework is that it allows us to give a precise
deﬁnition for anxiety in this context: anxiety is the psychological state given by the
expression in (8). Note that anxiety includes the second term in (8), which is similar
to the risk premium in (6), so anxiety is the broader concept in that sense. In this
context, however, r is a parameter of the φCL map and cannot be interpreted as the
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Indeed, the agent is risk neutral. Nevertheless,
throughout the paper we use the usual terminology. The ﬁrst term in (8) is the
agent’s disutility of eﬀort. Although normally we do not think of the latter as
having psychological connotations, in our model the disutility of eﬀort includes the
reduced-form φ that captures the unmodeled motivational/demotivational eﬀects of
anxiety referred to in the processing eﬃciency, reversal, and endogenous learning-
by-doing theories. As such, it falls under the anxiety concept. Anxiety is therefore
a “negative emotion” consisting of two components: the ﬁrst term captures the
motivational/demotivational eﬀects of anxiety, while the second reﬂects the direct
negative impact of uncertainty (e.g., worry).
Since the agent is risk neutral, expected second period utility is simply α+βe
and (2) becomes (8).
Let p > 0 denote the marginal beneﬁt of the agent’s eﬀort to the principal,
who therefore sets β such that 0 ≤ β ≤ p. As in Milgrom and Roberts (1992), we
assume the principal has access to a monitoring technology which can reduce V
at some cost. Speciﬁcally, the principal incurs the cost M(V), where M0 < 0 and
M00 > 0. A complete speciﬁcation of the contract is therefore (α,β,V).
Given the contract, the agent chooses eﬀort to maximize (6). Note that (6) is
strictly concave and eventually decreasing in eﬀort, so a solution exists, is unique,
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mainly a technical result which shows that the principal must incur a ﬁxed cost
β(V) > 0 to induce positive eﬀort because C0(0) > 0 (see Assumptions 1). Although
anxiety can act as a second source of motivation for the agent, compared with the
SLM, she is not intrinsically motivated in the sense that she will not work for free
or even for suﬃciently small but positive incentives.
Lemma 1. (i) If
(ˆ VI/V )1/2 ≥ φ(ˆ VI)C0(0) (9)
then for each V ∈ [0,V ] there exists a unique β(V) > 0 such that the agent’s
optimal eﬀort is zero for all 0 ≤ β ≤ β(V) and positive for all β > β(V). (ii)
Furthermore, β is continuous and strictly decreasing on [0,V ] and
0 < φ(ˆ VI)C0(0) ≤ β(V) ≤ C0(0) (10)
for all V ∈ [0,V ].
From now on, we assume p > C0(0) to ensure that the principal’s problem is
nontrivial for all V ∈ [0,V ].
We now turn to the comparative statics of the agent’s problem, with particu-
lar focus on conditions under which incentives and monitoring are demotivational.
Throughout the paper, partial derivatives are indicated by subscripts. Demotiva-
tional monitoring occurs when eV > 0, so that a reduction in monitoring would
result in an increase in V and therefore an increase in optimal eﬀort. Note that we





Proposition 1. (i) For all β > β(V),
eβ =
1 − 2βVφ0θ
φ2C00 and eV = −
β2φ0θ
φ2C00 . (12)
14(ii) There exists a nonempty open set involving β and V suﬃciently small where
incentives are motivational and monitoring demotivational. (iii) There also exists
a nonempty open set involving β and V suﬃciently large where incentives are
demotivational and monitoring is motivational.
For purposes of comparison, we note that eβ = 1/C00 > 0 and eV = 0 in the
SLM [see (5)]. According to (ii), incentives are motivational when β and V are
small, but monitoring is demotivational. In contrast, monitoring has no eﬀect on
eﬀort in the linear model. According to (iii), incentives are eventually demotiva-
tional for any ﬁxed V ∈ [0,V ], which corresponds to the experimental results in
Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2005).
We illustrate these results in Figure 2 below, which is similar to Figure 1 in
Frey and Jegen (2001).
Figure 2 Goes Here
For some ﬁxed V ∈ [0,V ], we assume the marginal cost of eﬀort is MC1 when
the principal sets β = β1 and the agent’s optimal eﬀort is e1. Now consider an
increase in β from β1 to β2, so the variance of income increases from β2
1V to β2
2V.
In the SLM, the marginal cost of eﬀort is independent of the variance of income,
so the agent would respond by increasing eﬀort from e1 to e2. In the present
model, however, the increase in uncertainty is interpreted positively by the agent
(the disutility of eﬀort falls) and is motivational (the marginal cost of eﬀort also
falls) when the variance of income is initially small. As a result, the marginal cost
of eﬀort shifts down to MC2 and there is a further increase in eﬀort from e2 to
e3. Incentives have “hidden rewards” in this range and are more powerful than in
standard theory.
On the other hand, if the variance of income is already suﬃciently large at
β = β1 then the increase in uncertainty is interpreted negatively (anxiety) and the
agent reacts by at least partially avoiding the task. In this range, incentives have
15“hidden costs” since anxiety is debilitating and demoralizing and the marginal cost
of eﬀort shifts up to MC2, causing the agent to reduce eﬀort from e2 to e4, for an
overall decline in eﬀort from e1 to e4.
Since the agent’s “performance” is q and expected performance equals optimal
eﬀort, we can also relate these results to the inverted-U hypothesis. For example, if
φ(VI) = aV 2
I + bVI + 1 and C(φe) = (1/2)(φe)2 (13)
then a simple exercise shows that
e∗ =
β
[1 + VI(b + aVI)]2 (14)
at an interior optimum. We plot this expression as a function of both β and V in
Panel A of Figure 3 below.3
Figure 3 Goes Here
Panel B depicts a cross-section in β when V = 1/10 and Panel C a cross-section in
V when β = 3. Expected performance is therefore hill-shaped in incentives and the
variance of the productivity shock, in accordance with the inverted-U hypothesis.
We now turn to the principal’s problem. Given the agent’s optimal eﬀort
e∗ = e(β,V), the principal chooses incentives and monitoring to maximize
TCE = pe∗ − C(φe∗) − (1/2)rβ2V − M(V) (15)
subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ p and V ∈ [0,V ]. As usual, we need not concern ourselves with
the agent’s participation constraint, since α will be set such that it always binds. A
solution to the principal’s problem clearly exists, since optimal eﬀort is continuous.4
Is it ever optimal for the principal to oﬀer demotivational incentives or engage
in demotivational monitoring? According to (i) of Proposition 2 below, incentives
3 In this example, C0(0) = 0 but we still obtain the indicated results. In Figure 3, a = 6/5 and
b = −2 and small changes in these parameters have no qualitative eﬀect.
4 Examples reveal that (15) is not necessarily strictly concave, so the ﬁrst-order conditions are
only necessary, not suﬃcient. Fortunately, that is all our results require.
16are never demotivational when the principal wishes to induce a positive level of
eﬀort β(V) < β and does not sell the ﬁrm to the agent β < p. In contrast, (ii)
states that the principal does engage in demotivational monitoring when the agent
is suﬃciently risk averse. Recall that Barkema (1995) provides empirical evidence
that real-world monitoring can indeed be demotivational when the principal-agent
relationship is close. This is consistent with (16) below, since a close principal-agent
relationship should entail a relatively low marginal cost of monitoring.
Proposition 2. (i) The principal never oﬀers demotivational incentives at any
optimum where the principal operates the ﬁrm and the agent supplies positive eﬀort.











In particular, there exists r > 0 such that monitoring is demotivational at all such
optima for all r > r.
In our model, the principal only oﬀers low-powered incentives (high-powered
incentives are demotivational by Proposition 1), which seems consistent with some
researchers’ views on the character of real-world compensation practices, such as
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) and Jensen and Murphy (1990).
Recall that Lazear (2000) found a strong positive relationship between incen-
tives and output using real-world data from an actual ﬁrm (Safelite Glass Corpora-
tion) which is presumably interested in maximizing proﬁts. In contrast, numerous
experimental studies in economics and psychology have either failed to ﬁnd such a
relationship or found a negative one. These two strands of the literature are often
juxtaposed, as when Lazear writes that “Claims by sociologists and others that
monetizing incentives may actually reduce output are unambiguously refuted by
the data” (cited in the introduction). In fact, what our paper shows is that these
two literatures are complementary, in the sense that exogenously set incentives can
17be demotivational as in Proposition 1, whereas real-world principals should never
endogenously set counterproductive incentives as in Proposition 2. In other words,
there is nothing inherently inconsistent with observing demotivational incentives in
the lab but motivational incentives in the ﬁeld, since the former are not generally
determined in a proﬁt-maximizing way.
Of course, Proposition 2 assumes a proﬁt-maximizing, well-informed principal.
If these assumptions are not met, then a real-world principal might very well set
counterproductive incentives. In fact, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000, Section III)
found that the vast majority (87% in the IQ experiment and 76% in the donation
experiment) of subjects acting as principals did indeed set demotivational incentives.
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem counterintuitive that the principal would refrain
from setting demotivational incentives but optimally engage in demotivational mon-
itoring. The explanation is that, although intense monitoring is costly and reduces
the agent’s eﬀort, it also reduces the agent’s risk premium. When the agent is suﬃ-
ciently risk averse, so that r is relatively high, the latter consideration becomes the
overriding one.
In the SLM, if monitoring were costless then the principal would immediately
set V = 0 and sell the ﬁrm to the agent (β = p). This is clear from (15) with
φ = 1, because in that case the only eﬀect of V is to increase the agent’s risk
premium since eV = 0. Together with the result that the principal does not use
mixed strategies, this is one facet of what Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 219) call
the informativeness principle.
Informativeness Principle. In designing compensation formulas, total value is
always increased by factoring into the determinant of pay any performance mea-
sure that (with the appropriate weighting) allows reducing the error with which
the agent’s choices are estimated and by excluding performance measures that in-
crease the error with which eﬀort is estimated (for example, because they are solely
reﬂective of random factors outside the agent’s control).
18In contrast, a central theme of the anxiety literature in both economics and
psychology is that anxiety can be motivational. If so, the principal will want to
indirectly manipulate it through her choices of β and V. In particular, if incentives
have hidden rewards through their eﬀects on the agent’s anxiety level, the principal’s
optimal setting of them will reﬂect this. In Proposition 3 below, we show that this
also applies to the principal’s optimal choice of V: if anxiety is motivational then
the principal might not want to eliminate it. In that case, she would choose an
incomplete level of monitoring (V > 0) even if monitoring were costless. In fact,
the principal might even introduce pure noise into the contract, in violation of the
informativeness principle.







then the principal chooses incomplete monitoring at the optimum. (ii) In particular,
if r is suﬃciently small relative to |φ0(0)| then there is incomplete monitoring at the
optimum even when monitoring is free.
Intuitively, the beneﬁts of complete monitoring are the elimination of the
agent’s risk premium and perhaps a reduction in the disutility of eﬀort. The costs
are the direct costs of monitoring, as well as the lost output which occurs as a
result of removing a prime source of the agent’s motivation. When the agent is
insuﬃciently risk averse relative to the marginal cost of monitoring |M0(0)| and the
initial motivational power of anxiety |φ0(0)|, then monitoring will be incomplete. If
|φ0(0)| is suﬃciently large, this will be so even when monitoring is costless.
The link between Propositions 2 and 3 is that the former establishes conditions
under which monitoring will be demotivational, whereas the latter considers the
extreme case where the principal goes all the way and completely eliminates all
uncertainty. According to (16), if r is suﬃciently high then the principal will engage
19in a high level of monitoring, which will be demotivational. If r is not too high,
however, (17) indicates that monitoring will be less than complete.
Our ﬁnal result concerns the risk-reward tradeoﬀ, a central feature of standard
principal-agent theory. In the SLM, the optimal β is decreasing in V when the
latter is exogenous, since an increase in V increases the marginal impact of β on
the risk premium, inducing the principal to reduce incentives. If the principal has
access to a costly monitoring technology then risk is endogenous and incentives and
monitoring are strategic complements. For example, an increase in p will induce
the principal to oﬀer stronger incentives and, subsequently, to engage in further
monitoring to keep the agent’s risk premium from rising too much. As Prendergast
(1999) points out, the empirical evidence for these predictions is mixed.
In contrast, Proposition 4 below shows that in our model incentives and risk
are actually strategic complements on a region where β and V are suﬃciently small
and β > β(V). In other words, incentives and monitoring are strategic substitutes
on that region. Recall that a real-valued function deﬁned on a Euclidean space is
strictly supermodular in its variables and parameters if all cross-partial derivatives
are strictly positive. For more information on lattice programming and supermod-




[p − C0(0)]|φ0(0)|C0(0)[2C00(0) + γ(0)]
C00(0)3 , (18)
where
γ = 2C002 − C0C000. (19)
(i) There exists ˜ β, ˜ V > 0 such that the TCE is strictly supermodular on the region
deﬁned by 0 ≤ V < ˜ V, β(V) < β < ˜ β, and ˜ β ≤ p. (ii) The optimal (second best)
β and V are increasing in p whenever they fall within this region.
20To get a clearer picture, we return to the example in (13) and (14) and plot
∂2TCE/∂β∂V in Figure 4 below.5
Figure 4 Goes Here
We observe that incentives and monitoring are strategic complements in the middle
region of Figure 4 where the cross-partial is negative, but strategic substitutes when
incentives and risk are both relatively large or both small, as stated in Proposition
4. These results suggest that optimal incentives could be non-monotonic in risk
when the latter is exogenous, which is conﬁrmed in Figure 5 below.6
Figure 5 Goes Here
A linear regression using the data in Figure 5 might not pick up any statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between incentives and risk, which might help explain the
mixed nature of the evidence on the risk-reward tradeoﬀ. Of course, a nonlinear
regression might reveal the true relationship.
4. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the psychological concept of anxiety into the standard
linear principal-agent model (SLM) of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987, 1991) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1992). We began with a brief survey of the anxiety litera-
ture in economics and psychology, including decision-theoretic foundations provided
by the processing eﬃciency, reversal, psychological expected utility, and endoge-
nous learning-by-doing theories. An important benchmark in that literature is the
inverted-U hypothesis, supported by numerous experimental and ﬁeld studies in-
cluding Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2005).
5 In Figure 4, p = 11/10, r = 1/10, and a and b are as in Figure 3. Note that we do not need
to specify monitoring costs for this cross-partial derivative.
6 Figure 5 was generated using the same parameter conﬁguration as Figure 4.
21To formally model the eﬀects of anxiety, we added the map φ(VI) into the
agent’s disutility of eﬀort to capture the motivational/demotivational aspects of
the variance VI of income. If φ ≡ 1 then our model is identical to the SLM, so the
model in this paper generalizes the latter. We showed that φ can be interpreted as
a reduced-form representation of unmodeled psychological processes or arising out
of the Caplin-Leahy psychological expected utility framework.
After incorporating φ into the SLM, the agent’s behavior becomes consistent
with the inverted-U hypothesis. In particular, high-powered incentives and intense
monitoring can be demotivational in line with the experimental evidence in Ariely,
Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2005) and empirical work by Barkema (1995). In
contrast, in the SLM optimal eﬀort is monotonically increasing in incentives and
independent of monitoring.
As Prendergast (1999, p. 18) points out, there is little conclusive evidence that
real-world ﬁrms actually use counterproductive incentives, despite the experimental
evidence. In this paper, we reconciled this apparent discrepancy by showing that
although high-powered incentives are demotivational, a proﬁt-maximizing principal
never oﬀers them. Moreover, the fact that the principal only oﬀers low-powered
incentives is consistent with the view expressed in Baker, Jensen, and Murphy
(1988) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) that incentives often appear weak in real-
world organizations.
On the other hand, the principal does engage in demotivational monitoring
when the agent is suﬃciently risk averse relative to the marginal cost of monitoring
and the motivational eﬀects of anxiety. We used this result to re-interpret Barkema’s
(1995) empirical evidence in support of demotivational monitoring, since a close
principal-agent relationship should also entail relatively low monitoring costs.
If monitoring were costless, then in the SLM the principal would eliminate
all risk and sell the ﬁrm to the agent since in that model risk only increases the
agent’s risk premium and cannot serve any positive role. In contrast, in our model
anxiety can be motivational so monitoring will be incomplete even when the latter
22is costless, as long as the agent is not too risk averse. Indeed, the principal may even
want to introduce additional risk in settings where it is initially negligible, which
violates the informativeness principle.
Finally, in the SLM there is a negative relationship between incentives and risk
and incentives and monitoring are strategic complements. In our model, however,
the former relationship can be non-monotonic, which may help explain the mixed
nature of the evidence on the risk-reward tradeoﬀ as characterized by Prendergast
(1999, p. 19). Moreover, in our model incentives and monitoring can be strategic
substitutes when incentives and risk are both relatively low or high, and strategic
complements otherwise.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove (i), ﬁx V ∈ [0,V ]. Since the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition is necessary
and suﬃcient, optimal eﬀort is zero iﬀ β/φ ≤ C0(0). If V = 0 then φ = 1 and the
condition becomes β ≤ C0(0) so β(0) = C0(0). Assume V > 0. The function β/φ is
continuous and strictly increasing on 0 ≤ β ≤ (ˆ VI/V)1/2 and takes the value zero







at the right endpoint. It follows that β(V) exists and is unique. It is clearly
continuous in V, and since an increase in the latter pivots β/φ upwards about the
origin, it is also strictly decreasing on [0,V ]. To prove (10), we note that
β(V) = φ(β(V)2V)C0(0) ≥ φ(ˆ VI)C0(0) > 0, (A.2)
which completes the proof.
23Proof of Proposition 1
(i) is a simple exercise. To prove (ii) and (iii), deﬁne the continuous functions




1 ((0,∞)) ∩ h
−1
2 ([0, ˆ VI)) (A.3)
is open in R+ and nonempty, since it contains (β,V ) = (p,0) [recall p > C0(0)].
On this open set, optimal eﬀort is interior and (12) is valid. Furthermore, φ0 < 0
because 0 ≤ VI < ˆ VI. It follows that eβ,eV > 0 on the open set deﬁned by (A.3).
Similarly, eV < 0 on
h
−1
1 ((0,∞)) ∩ h
−1
2 ((ˆ VI,∞)). (A.4)
Since φ0 is strictly increasing and θ is bounded from below by C0(0) > 0, the term
1 − 2βVφ0θ diverges to −∞ as β,V → ∞.
Proof of Proposition 2
The derivative of (6) with respect to β is
(p − φC0)eβ − 2βVeφ0C0 − rβV. (A.5)
Using the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition, we must have
(p − β)eβ = βV(r + 2eφ0C0) (A.6)
at an interior optimum for β. An optimum involving demotivational incentives
would require eβ < 0 and φ0 suﬃciently positive, which is inconsistent with (A.6).
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition for V can be written
(p − β)eV = β2[eφ0C0 + (1/2)r] + M0. (A.7)
The right-hand side of (A.7) is positive iﬀ (16) holds, using (11). Note that β is
uniformly bounded away from zero because eﬀort is positive by hypothesis and from
24(10). Finally, the right-hand side of (16) is a continuous function on the nonempty
compact set deﬁned by the constraints V ∈ [0,V ] and β(V) ≤ β ≤ p. Monitoring
is therefore always demotivational if r exceeds its maximum.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there is an optimum with positive eﬀort and V = 0. From (12), eβ > 0
and (A.5) reduces to (p−β)eβ, which is strictly positive for all β(V) < β < p. The
principal therefore sets β = p when V = 0 (i.e., she sells the ﬁrm to the agent).
The ﬁrst-order condition for V
(p − β)eV − β2[eφ0(0)C0(e) + (1/2)r] − M0(0) ≤ 0 (A.8)
can therefore be written as
−p2[p(C0)−1(p)φ0(0) + (1/2)r] − M0(0) ≤ 0 (A.9)
using (11) and the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition p = β = C0. After re-arranging, we
get the opposite of (17).
Proof of Proposition 4







β2V(2φ02 − φφ00) − φφ0
i
− γβφ0(1 − 2βVφ0C0)

(A.10)
for all V ∈ [0,V ] and β > β(V). Substituting β = φC0 into (A.5) and diﬀerenti-
ating with respect to V,
(p − β)eβV − rβ − 2βVθφ0eV − 2βe
h
φ0C0 + β2V(φ00C0 + eφ02C00)
i
. (A.11)
The sign of (A.11) evaluated at the point β = β(0) = C0(0) and V = 0 (where
optimal eﬀort is zero) equals the sign of
[p − C0(0)]|φ0(0)|C0(0)[2C00(0) + γ(0)]
C00(0)3 − r. (A.12)
25If (18) holds, then ∂2TCE/∂V∂β > 0 for V ≥ 0 and β > β(V) in a neighborhood
of that point. In other words, incentives and monitoring are strategic substitutes.
According to Proposition 1,
∂2TCE
∂p∂β




= eV > 0 (A.14)
for V ≥ 0 and β > β(V) in a neighborhood of the same point for all p > C0(0).
Claim (i) follows and (ii) is an application of theorem 2.3 in Vives (1999, p. 26).
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